

**ON JAMAL AD-DIN AL-AFGHANI AND THE 19TH CENTURY
ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT**

Seda ÜNSAR*

Abstract:

The essay analyzes Afghani's system of thought within the paradigm of the 19th century Islamic political thought by setting the Islamic institutional margins shaped by internal and external factors. The internal factors regard the Islamic theoretical formation while the external ones are determined by the dialectic of Western domination and patterns of reaction to it. Despite the controversy regarding his life, motives and ideas, Afghani is treated -in the context here- as a visionary in whose life the most common theme was 'disappointment', and a free-thinker who used, in debates with Western philosophers, such radical notions as the universality of science, faith in lieu of religion, and language as the main constituent of the nation. Afghani indeed took up and analyzed issues that are still at the heart of contemporary debates on religion and philosophy in the 19th century. One aspect of the essay is the emphasis on the idea that non-Western thinkers such as Afghani should be analyzed with a perspective different from that for the Western thinkers due to not merely the different institutional boundaries of the thought system that they have emerged within, but also the fact that the Western thinkers have not been burdened with the task of a tremendous struggle against the hegemony of the dominant economics, politics and intellectual paradigm (of the West).

Keywords: Islamic political thought, (Western) Hegemony, Secularism, Religion

* Yrd. Doç. Dr., İstanbul Arel Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, seda.unsar@gmail.com

JAMAL AD-DİN AL-AFGHANI VE 19. YÜZYIL İSLAM DÜŞÜNCESİ

Öz:

Makale, Afgani'nin düşünce sistemini, 19. Yüzyıl İslami siyasal düşünce paradigması içinde, iç ve dış faktörlerce şekillenen İslami kurumsal sınırları belirlemek suretiyle inceler. İç etkenlerden kasıt İslami teorik oluşumken; dış etkenlerden kastedilen ise Batı hakimiyeti ve bu hakimiyete tepki diyalektiği tarafından belirlenmiştir. Hayatı, gerekçeleri ve fikirleri hakkındaki ihtilaflara rağmen, hayatının en sık tekrarlanan teması hayalkırıklığı olan Afghani, buradaki konu dahilinde, bir vizyoner olarak ele alınmış ve Batılı filozoflarla tartışmalarında, bilimin evrenselliği, din yerine inançtan söz edişi, ulusu oluşturan temel öge olarak dil birliği gibi konularla ortaya koyduğu özgür ve zamanının ilerisinde olan düşünce yapısına dikkat çekilmiştir. Afgani günümüzde dahi tartışılan din ve felsefe meselelerini 19. Yüzyılda ele almış ve çözümlenmeye çalışmıştır. Makalenin bir yönü de Afghani gibi pekçok İslami düşünür ele alınırken, içinden çıktıkları düşünce sisteminin kurumsal sınırlarının yanı sıra, hakim bir başka ekonomiye, siyasete ve entellektüel paradigmaya karşı mücadele vermek zorunda olmayan Batı düşünürlerinden farklı bağlamda değerlendirilmeleri gereğidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İslami düşünce sistemi, (Batı) Hegemonyası, Sekülerizm, Din

INTRODUCTION

In most of the writings in which the intellectuals of the Islamic world develop their political ideals, one finds a perplexing web of multifaceted tasks and atypical (from a Western stand point¹) notions of Islamic political theory. This observation gets all the more confusing when and if the diverse writings of the same intellectual evolve around seemingly contradictory notions of Islamic intellectual and political legacy. This is one reason why Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani appears as one of the most dramatic figures of the 19th century Islamic world. It is important to analyze his life with all its mystery due to the differences of accounts, and his works within the complexities of the time period, which involved not only Western penetration (and the resultant Muslim submission or resistance) but also intense intellectual debates regarding the nature of Western and Islamic political philosophy.

To place Afghani's political ideas in perspective, we need to consider the 'richness' of the Islamic political theories that were available to both the reformists and the orthodox. The foremost of these theories were the Quran, the "Sunna" (the practice of the prophet Mohammed), the "Idjma" (consensus of the Islamic community, and the agreement of the Islamic jurists on a principle deduced from these sources) as well as the Turko-Iranian-Mongolian theory of secular legislation and state supremacy (Mardin: 1962). This point per se lays down the different *internal* factors that shape Islamic thought and affect its institutional evolution versus the institutional evolution of Western thought. To complete the perspective, we need to reflect on the completely different *external* factors that the evolution of Islamic political thought was exposed to: the Western thought evolved without a present and contiguous threat of imperialism from the East whereas the Islamic thought developed under the very real threat of Western imperialism over the economic, political and the cultural. Thus, the task of Western enlightenment was relatively and comparatively clear -or at least one-faceted- in this sense. The tasks of Islamic intellectuals, particularly those ahead of their time, were not only many-sided and versatile but also intertwined².

Having briefly outlined the inner and outer dynamics that shaped the 19th century Islamic thought, let us illustrate, to an extent, the impact of those dynamics on the evolution of Afghani's political philosophy. In the main, Afghani's life revolved around two tasks: the reformation of Islam, for which he seems to have likened himself to Martin Luther, and the unification of the Islamic world, for which he seems to have dedicated his life. Keddie claims that Afghani was a constant interpreter of Islam who rejected both "unthinking traditionalism and blind imitation of the Christian West" (Keddie, 1968:3). Yet, since what Afghani saw as "unthinking traditionalism" and "blind imitation" and an intellectual of the modern age would see diverge at great length, analyzing Afghani as merely a neo-traditionalist may not capture the whole picture³.

In Islam, the law precedes the state as the main principle of guidance for social cohesion. Although the Ottoman Sultan enjoyed a secular lawmaking power the background of which had been set by the Islamic conception of "Örf" whose origins can be traced to Tuğrul Bey -a Selçuk Turk, of the 11th century- and the following Turko-Iranian governmental practices of 'secularization' of the public law; in Islam, the law, *Sharia*, based on the Quran, is the ultimate source according to which the political organization, taxation and the militancy issues are determined for the Muslim believers that constitute the whole as a community⁴. Hence, the theory does not derive itself from a lay ethics basis but from the religious dicta of the Quran, and becomes a principle of unity personified by *Allah* (God). One significant product of this theory is that the idea of a contract of society has a much more restricted substratum in Islamic theory compared to Greek, Roman, medieval Christian and finally modern Western thought. The other product equally significant is that the Islamic conception of natural law differs from even the medieval Western conception.

In Western thought, the distinction existed between natural law as the will of the divinity and natural law as an order of things existing independently of the will of the divinity with again divinity's will and wish. Although Aristotle did not explore the problem of the originator of the order of nature and only asserted that the universe always existed, even St. Thomas provided the base for a belief in the autonomy of nature, which made the secularization of natural law possible. Furthermore, the underlying

ancient Greek conception of natural law, e.g. in Heraclitus, was the idea of a common natural source of laws and physical motion. Accordingly, Roman theory of natural law, e.g. in Cicero, was the product "not of opinion" but of a "certain innate force", which was "a part of a world of self-moving things". These conceptions found their grounds more firmly in Galileo, and in a law of nature unfolding itself without the active intervention of God, which absorbed the use of reason and rationality in the sphere of natural law (Mardin, 1962: 87-88).

In the case of Islam, Islamic natural law could only be conceived as the very presence of God (with no distinction between the law of God and the law of nature for a future secularist –in the separatist sense- evolution). This conception bore the idea that the law of universe, that is the law of God, could not be captured by the mere use of reason. Theoretically, the idea is that the rule of Quran is extremely inelastic and the will of God may at any moment disrupt the order of nature. Due to the fact that the basis of the Islamic theory derived itself from the dicta of Quran (and hadith) rather than worldly ethics, Islam divulged that “the foundation of Islamic social polity made on the basis of compact of agreement, being understood that this agreement was by no means one between two equals [but was] rather a compact of submission, which reflects the nature of *Allah's* covenant with man” (Mardin, 1962: 85)⁵. According to Mardin, this is obvious in the overriding acceptance of Gazali in opposition to Ibn Rushd's attempt to allow for the idea of “a self-moving nature”. Even in Ibn Khaldun, who attempted to introduce the idea of regularity of social occurrences in Islamic thought, the use of reason in politics was taken with suspicion while Ibn Sina, who was a follower of Farabi, tried to achieve a synthesis between the idea of a divinely ordained political system and that of a secular kingship, and succeeded in linking the ideal state of Islam with the ideal state of Plato's philosopher-king. In the end, the Islamic jurists did devise (three) escape hatches notwithstanding the limitations set by the Islamic principle of the ‘(active) immanence of God’.

What al-Afghani thought of as “unthinking traditionalism”, “blind imitation”, and “reformation” is better analyzed through this Islamic perspective. This was quite the inner scope al-Afghani was limited to in his efforts to reform or renew (*tecdid*) Islam, which were of secondary

importance compared to his actions to attain Islamic solidarity -as Afghani deemed solidarity against imperialism and achieving (political, economic, cultural) independence to be more urgent, and did not believe that such mission could be realized through reforming Islam by attempting to awaken the (uneducated) masses.

The fact that in his answer to Renan, Afghani seems to have caught the restricted substratum of theory of politics (because a consequence of Islamic theory is a political theory, “which is philosophical rather than theological in nature and immediately becomes suspect to the orthodox” (Mardin, 1962: 84) and Afghani declares “so long as humanity exists, the struggle will not cease between dogma and free investigation, between religion and philosophy; a desperate struggle in which, I fear, the triumph will not be for free thought” (Afghani in Keddie, 1968: 187)⁶, it could have been illuminating had Afghani been clear and consistent on the basic tenets of his theory of politics whether based on philosophy or religion. And it could have been even more so had we had more converging substantiation as to how and why Afghani as activist for Islamic unity (and speaker to his Eastern audience) and Afghani as reformist of the religion of Islam (and speaker to a Western audience) would not be the two contradictory phenomena of his life.

No thinker can be stripped off his environment and the political developments of his time. The British penetration as colonial attempts in mainly India and Egypt resolved Afghani’s will to seek ways to prevent it. Hence, the major mission Afghani took on himself was to arouse the pride of the Islamic communities (i.e. in India and Egypt); he wisely chose to emphasize their pre-Islamic history in order to creep into the elements that awaken a sense of ‘pride’ in society as well as to instill the idea that the Western development was a result of what pure Islam had at the time of the Prophet and that Islam should take back what it already owns from the West. As an Islamic thinker, and due to the nature of imperialism, which involved a civilizational attack on the Muslim society, Islam as a civilization to be proud of and as a religion to be the coalescing force for the masses proved to be the only salvation for Afghani. The reference to “a pure Islam once in existence” served to soften potential reactions from uneducated masses to the attempts of rationalization/secularization/modernization needed in order

to buffer colonialism by way of setting free the path of science (and therefore development). This state of affairs formed the outer structure Afghani was restrained by. The clash of the realms of the internal and external would obviously have been unnecessary had Afghani been merely an orthodox.

D) AFGHANI: A “PROGRESSIVE” INTELLECTUAL?

Afghani's leading role as an enlightened intellectual who strives to awaken masses is at its peak in his *“Lecture on Teaching and Learning”*, which he delivered in 1882. His equation of the motive and method for truth to philosophy instead of religion is the first remarkable idea of the lecture. The rational and logical underpinnings of his thought are apparent from the beginning when he claims that there is no end or limit to science and that it is science that ruled; rules; and will rule the world. The profoundness of his thought is introduced with his argument that *“men must be related to science, not science to men”* since by asserting that science cannot and should not be divided (as by Ulema) into Muslim science and European science, he refers to the universality of science. It further signals the idea of institutionalization. The inherent rationality of his thought gains an empiricist stratum when he affirms that *“the truth is where there is proof”* (Afghani in Keddie, 1968: 107)⁷ What is even more striking is his assertion that reform of religion can never be achieved by the Muslims except *“from above”* because the masses are normally religiously educated, and philosophical education, which is the method and motive for truth, can only be attained by a society that has studied science and thus is able to understand proofs and demonstrations.

In *“The Benefits of Philosophy”*, Afghani places philosophy to the center as the cause of man's intellectual activity (with a hint at neither Quran nor where Quran fits in this scheme) and owing to this quality, of his emergence from the sphere of animals. He determines that without philosophy, there is no production of knowledge, and eventually no progress, and that the objective should be to reach scientific truth (Afghani in Keddie, 1968: 109-123)⁸. He attacks the Ulema for their *“blindness”* almost with the same reasons as Kılıçzade -hardly a representative of the new Ottoman *“political elite”*- would do one century later (Berkes, 1964: 378)⁹. His

accusation of Islam and the Ulema in the way of progress is all the more direct and clear-cut in his “*Answer of Jalal ad-Din to Renan*” in 1883 (Afghani in Keddie, 1968: 181-187)¹⁰.

A most impressive point Afghani makes in the same letter is his explanation of language as the main constituent of the nation rather than some distant ethnic ancestors that people do not necessarily connect with psychologically. This emphasis and defense of an embryonic ideology that is civic nationalism of the 20th century against the racist side of Renan’s argument deserves genuine attention¹¹. In addition, a recurring theme of Afghani’s writings is education and he returns to the subject once more in “*Commentary on the Commentator*”; he asserts the nature and purpose of education with precision and certainty, and points out that “education, if it is good, produces perfection from imperfection, and nobility from baseness. If it is not good, it changes the basic state of nature and becomes the cause of decline and decadence” (Afghani in Keddie, 1968: 123)¹². Once again, he refers to the lack of faith, which results in disorder and corruption instead of wording it as the lack of religion. As Keddie refers in “*The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdulhamid II*” to an analysis by Bernard Lewis that is Islam meant a civilization for Afghani, a world power potentially and only incidentally a faith, Afghani realizes an almost resounding dissection of faith from religion. In fact, this is due to his conviction of reviving the Islamic civilization, which was superior in its purity in old times, and its need of a demand for loyalty rather than piety¹³. Hourani states that “because the reforms of the 19th century had given the Christian subjects freedom without giving them a principle of loyalty, their freedom had enabled them to liberate themselves from the Empire, and the foreign Powers, particularly Russia, were encouraging and helping them in this” (Hourani, 1983: 104). Afghani’s demand (from the Muslim world) for loyalty has an analogous context. Hence, in “*Islamic Solidarity*”, Afghani hints at the legitimacy issues for the rulers explaining how for the people of Islam, religious identity overwhelms any tribal, ethnic, or national identity, and so long as the ruler is just, his nationality would not matter for his subjects, but if the ruler deviates from justice, he will lose the affection of his subjects (Afghani in Donohue and Esposito, 2007: 16-20)¹⁴. Hourani also points out that Afghani taught theology, jurisprudence, mysticism, and philosophy while encouraging his disciples to write, publish newspapers, and to form a public opinion which

constitutes the intellectual basis of his activism (Hourani, 1983: 109) and could be related to his concepts of loyalty of the people and legitimacy of the rulers.

II) AFGHANI: “A SINGLE-MINDED VISIONARY DRIVEN BY A CAUSE”¹⁵ (PAN-ISLAMISM)

The Ulema of 1870 condemned Afghani for his speech at the opening of the Dar-ül-fünun, which was to consist of three faculties (Philosophy and Letters; Law; Mathematical and Physical Sciences) (Berkes, 1964: 180)¹⁶. How the transition from “an Afghani of mental associate of the Tanzimat reformists in 1870”, to “an Afghani of mental associate of Abdulhamid II, who was the destructive enemy of the Tanzimat reformists in 1892” occurred is the challenge of any scholar who studies the Islamic thought in the Liberal Age. The challenge lies in that there could be two equally sound explanations, which would have equally meticulous support. It could well be argued that Afghani, in 1892, is only ‘the speaker of the East to the East’ – once more- who calls for a revival of purified religion in that an inner turn to the Islam of the Prophet should and could be done without the penetration of Western secularist ideas, and the primary aim should be achieving Islamic unification (to face the penetration of the Western political system) through which an effective defense against Western imperialism could be organized.

The challenge is whether or not we can assert that Afghani chose this role on purpose being aware that it was the only way to reach the masses (as he several times pointed out in his aforementioned writings); and if so, the question is: what is the basis of his hostility toward the men of Tanzimat, Abdulhamid II’s Constitutional enemies, who according to Keddie, ideologically should have been his heroes?¹⁷ If though, Afghani was hostile to Tanzimat not in terms of ideas per se, but for its timing, means, and the fact that because it was undertaken under Western pressure (for Western gains and by increasing the non-Muslim leverage in the empire) it seemed to be a capitulation rather than emancipation; in what other ways did he envision a rationalized religion as long as no attempt to change the masses was undertaken “from above” (as he in fact suggested in his “*Lecture on Teaching and Learning*”) and as long as submission to a Sultan hostile to a rational religion remained unchallenged? In other words, even if one could

wish for a different mechanism of change, in a conjuncture where Tanzimat was the only one imposed, why was he not satisfied with a mere critique but felt that he had to vehemently attack the men behind it? Could it also be that Afghani was hostile to Tanzimat for lesser reasons as many other Muslims were: the Tanzimat was a product of a desperate need to satisfy the non-Muslim subjects of the empire among whom national aspirations were increasingly and dangerously gaining strength?¹⁸ Could it be Afghani's preoccupation with Europe's wish to destroy the Muslim world and his belief that Tanzimat provided a pretext for it by disrupting the unity of the Muslim nation and simultaneously encouraging the unity of the non-Muslims? If we cannot assert that Afghani was using Pan-Islamism for the obvious reasons, we are left with the argument that there is a transition from a denounced heretic to a heretic denouncer attributing its causes to the contradictions of his time. In that case, however, we have to reconcile his thoughts as a continuous process since "*The Refutation of Materialists*" is written in 1884 while "*The Truth about the Neicheri Sect*" is written in 1881; not distant dates from his "*Answer to Renan*" and "*Lecture on Teaching and Learning*" both of which carry the date 1882. Yet, one worthy point would be Afghani's disappointment with Abdulhamid II, who used religion in the form of Pan-Islamism as he discovered Islam to be a rallying point for both internal and external support, and hence an effective tool to maneuver against the West as the "Sick Man of Europe". Abdulhamid II was a realist in that he was well aware that Afghani's persistent calls for "holy war" against Western imperialism were merely whimsy although he was not a realist in believing that the interests of Ottoman Muslims and of Muslims outside the empire could ever converge sufficiently.

"Pan-Islamism tended to overshadow two movements, which will prove to be more important in coming generations-nationalism and constitutionalism" (Berkes, 1964: 270). Afghani, yet, invited the Muslims (of e.g. Afghanistan or the Jinsiyyat-i Turkiyyeh-Turcomans "who should be proud of their past independent history and who fell under the domination of Russians") to a religious struggle (Muharibeh-yi Diniyyeh) and a *nationalist* endeavor (Mujahideh-yi Milliyeh) within a mixture of secularism and religious nationalism to gain their independence from European domination (Keddie, 1966)¹⁹. Still, as Berkes argues, "[Ironically] the pan-Islamic hallucination found its reward not in a unification of believers around the

caliph but in Western-supported nationalist movements [and] Arnold Toynbee's judgment that pan-Islamism served to create parochial nationalisms rather than a universal unity of the Muslims would be closer to the truth if he had granted this achievement to the British rather than to the visionary and contradictory Afghani" (Berkes, 1964: 270)". As for the Ottomans, to stress Afghani's call for a religious struggle and a nationalist endeavor is definitely not to suggest that Afghani initiated the emergence of nationalism there, especially since nationalism (within a more secular context) materialized through the "men of pen" who were the descendants of the "men of Tanzimat" that Afghani denounced and condemned even more fervently than Abdulhamid II himself²⁰. The trace of secularist ideas in Afghani's repeated calls for independence faces a question mark especially if we consider how difficult and challenging it is to connect his assertion that "science was, is and will be the only true ruler" to his belief that "faith and the number of Muslims could overcome Western technology". The challenge lies in that he might have only consciously chosen the latter claim as mere rhetorical suggestion to the elite, for the man on the street, to embellish his zealous purpose: an infinite struggle for independence (from first off, imperialism and later, the domination of the "irrational" over the "rational" in the religion of Islam). And yet, when and if that battle was won, how would the renewal or reform of Islam that he sought be achieved without the institutional, intellectual, social and political background?

CONCLUSION

This essay was an introduction of Afghani's system of thought through his selected writings in Western literature that would highlight the main problematique here: for Afghani's legacy to be contextualized, the boundaries of Islamic political thought due to internal and external factors should be clarified. Such boundaries are drawn by the nature of Islamic political theory (internal) and the dynamics of imperial domination and modes of resistance (external).

Ultimately, Afghani appears as a farsighted thinker for such ideas of his as the universality of science, distinction between faith and religion, and the unity of language as the basis of nation -despite his merciless condemnation of his contemporaries who sought to open institutional paths for those

secular developments. One reason for the contradiction in question could be the need, in Afghani's eyes, for the unification and emancipation of the Muslim world from the Western (political and economic) yoke before any kind of religious liberation (reformation or awakening) could be undertaken, because if such a task were started without securing independence first, it would lead to more capitulation²¹

The final word regarding the most common theme of Afghani's life that is disappointment would be on the impossibility of his inspirations especially in his age. The nationalistic drive behind a pan-Islamic mask –for, undoubtedly, tacit approval, by the masses, of modernization, development, secularization, etc for independence and its maintenance- is definitely a phenomenon that Afghani left behind, by and large, unresolved for the next century. The Islamic world continued to witness the same fervent debates vis-à-vis the nature of Western and Islamic political theory and philosophy. The 20th century in fact buried pan-Islamism as an ideology along with a world empire. Yet, the intellectual debates and political tension is there, at least for the 21st century, within a package of religious ideologies born in the previous century.

END NOTES

-
- ¹ Mardin (1962: 106) draws attention to this point by stating that “among *modern Western* students of the Ottoman Empire for whom the high value of political and social dissent is *axiomatic*, this ability of the individual to identify his own aim with that of the state has not been given the imperial and objective treatment it deserves, but the evolution of Young Ottoman thought makes little sense if it is ignored”. “This ability of the individual” that Mardin talks about here refers to the “obverse facet of the tradition of obeisance and the absence in Islam of a widely accepted theory of justified resistance”. I think it is also a crucial point in comprehending Afghani (and others who had similar ambitions) as “a man of action” and the immense difficulty his efforts faced in order to “achieve Islamic solidarity” without “a widely accepted theory of justified resistance” within the Islamic intellectual heritage. Since European political theory did not divulge in the same manner, it might be more confusing for a modern Western scholar if this point is ignored.
 - ² Afghani, in his answer to Renan, points out that Christianity preceded Islam by many centuries and that he hoped that the Muslim society would someday break its bonds and march resolutely in the path of civilization following the manner of the Christian society. Afghani also argues that although all religions were intolerant, and Christianity was particularly so, Christian faith was not an invincible obstacle in the way of progress, implying that the Muslim faith would not be either. Here, we see an implication of faith and religion as separate phenomena. Further, Afghani demonstrates the intolerance and imperfection Christianity had by divulging into the basic principles of that religion such as the Trinity, incarnation and transubstantiation which he finds flawed. For details on these issues, see Afghani (1883) ‘*Answer to Renan*’ in Keddie (1968: 181-187), Keddie (1968: 84-96) and also Keddie (1968: especially p. 181).
 - ³ Berkes (1964: 293) states: “The intellectuals were not constitutionalists or liberals, socialists or anarchists. Yet, they had the taint of all these. ...the Hamidian autocracy created the type of intellectuals for whom I find no better term than the word *dehri*, the word that had come to be used as a label for those who were believed to be materialists or atheists, but that, in reality, meant nothing but the Western word secularist. They were denounced because of the common thread running through them all-the denial of tradition...Everything that was seen to be an enforced belief was rejected as irrational”. Berkes (1964: 266) also pays attention to the “picture of the *nachari*” in which Afghani seems to have hastily included “men of every variety of thought from the Greek atomists to Darwin, from Mazdak to Rousseau; every group or movement from Jews to freemasons, from Ismailis to Mormons, from liberals to socialists or communists...Everywhere, whether in ancient Greece or Iran, Christendom or Islam, India or Turkey, these wretched nacharis were traitors to religion and society, deniers of God, destroyers of law and morality”. Afghani later depicted Süleyman Pasha as a *dehri* although Süleyman Pasha was one of the men of constitutionalism but “from an ideological point only an Islamist one” Berkes (1964: 317). This is why Afghani’s categorization of concepts such as materialism, traditionalism, blind imitation, as well as his attack on the men of Tanzimat make more sense if this difference in perspectives that Berkes points out is taken into account here.
 - ⁴ It should be noted that those issues not available in the Quran were searched within the *Hadiith* and if not available, then the *Örf* was the vehicle.

-
- ⁵ Khadduri, *War and Peace*, p.7, 8, 9 quoted in Mardin (1962: 85). The nature of "contract" formed the very nature of the institutional evolution complementary in the West with the presence of and in the East with the absence of persistent societal forces and the development of property rights. The inherent understanding of the contract also lies at the core of the explanation for the lack of development of property rights and societal forces to demand it "from below". See for the Western developments on "social contract" / "the people's law" and its relation to how Western nations built their formal property systems that played a positive in the construction of industrial capitalism to which the Islamic world was integrated as, by and large, a vast market of resources, and on the development of property rights as the basis of Western capitalism, De Soto, Hernando (2000).
- ⁶ Keddie (1968) convincingly argues that what Afghani had at stake (due to an obvious opposition from the Ulema) delivering his thoughts to Renan shows that he was not only striving for respect from a Western audience but it was an opportunity he did not hesitate to take in order to explain his sincere views. ("If the "Answer to Renan" does not represent Afghani's true beliefs, it is almost impossible to imagine why he should have opened himself up in print to possible further attack from orthodox Muslims". Keddie (1968: 91)). One main reason behind his more religious stance in front of an Eastern audience is his solid conviction of the need for Islamic political unification against Western imperialism and of his view that because the masses were not properly educated, the idea of rationalization in religion would attract staunch opposition. The rest of his sentence in part quoted above is "because the masses dislike reason, and its teachings are only understood by some intelligences of the elite, and because, also, science, however beautiful it is, does not completely satisfy humanity, which thirsts for the ideal and which likes to exist in dark and distant regions that the philosophers and scholars can neither perceive nor explore", and it implies that the means to achieve Islamic solidarity, by nature, involve a religious framework rather than one based on reason. This also be a reason why he disapproved the men of Tanzimat, which we will explore shortly. Afghani also states that while reason should (and does in fact) rule the mind at all times, the soul will always look for a shelter in religion.
- ⁷ See the original source, Afghani's lecture: Afghani (1882) '*Lecture on Teaching and Learning*' in Keddie (1968: 101-108). Also, see Keddie (1970) for further on Afghani.
- ⁸ See for further, the original source: Afghani, '*Benefits of Philosophy*' in Keddie (1968: 109-123)
- ⁹ For information on Kılıçzade, see further Berkes (1964).
- ¹⁰ See for details, the original source, Afghani's letter: Afghani (1883) '*Answer to Renan*' in Keddie (1968: 181-187).
- ¹¹ Keddie (1968) states that in Afghani, "There is aggressive cultural defensiveness.... There is the nationalist pride" and that "a purified Islam would be a more rational religion than Christianity, since Islam was free of the irrational elements of Christianity".
- ¹² See for details, the original source: Afghani, '*Commentary on the Commentator*' in Keddie (1968: 123-130).
- ¹³ See Keddie (1966: 50). This is a strong assertion of Lewis despite the fact that Afghani chooses to become (or to be portrayed as) a devout Muslim later on. For further on this, see Lewis (1964: 103).
- ¹⁴ See for further, the original source: Afghani, '*Islamic Solidarity*' in Donohue and Esposito (2007: 16-20). There are several points to make here. On the one hand, justice is

defined within the context of Quran since Afghani cites Quran (49:13): “The noblest among you in the eyes of God is the most pious” and relates it to his claim that the noble “are raised to power only because of their obedience to law and to the intense zeal they display in observing it” (not due to hereditary nobility). In stating this, Afghani probably had in mind the Rightful Caliphs. On the other, the Ottoman Empire had incapable rulers as well as capable ones. Although the rulers had an undisputable impact on the formation of institutions in the Ottoman world, attributing the decline of the empire to this fact per se, would be missing the whole point on institutional evolution in terms of the development of continuous dealings in the society. Again, the rulers’ acceptance by the people (legitimacy in a sense) has not always been as Afghani suggests. And the reason was not always “deviation from justice” but a mixed bag of different social, political, and economic factors under varying internal and external circumstances as the societies became more complex. Also, one should keep in mind that whereas the European theories of “responsible government” had grown around theories of justified resistance and atomistic individualism, the major Islamic theory had not evolved an accepted theory of justified resistance and had not provided a theory of individualism –although this does not mean that there were no significant attempts at devising a theory of resistance; on the contrary, the history of Islam is full of such incidents-, which tied the hands of the new agents of change in the Ottoman Empire as one major shortcoming in their task of modernization and progress as they did not know how to resolve the apparent tension, and conciliate an adaptation of an “Eastern” society to “Western” institutions. This could also be the reason why Afghani is satisfied using the word “affection” because the political theory of Islam preaches to wait with patience in face of dissatisfaction that emanates from a Muslim ruler. Afghani makes a point which would be relevant to evaluating the contemporary rise in support for religious movements when he refers to the rise of corruption, the loss of legitimacy for the rulers and the consequent decline of society. Still, he does not address the question of what will happen after a just ruler even if he is ever to be found. This is one place where he seems to have ignored the importance of institutional dynamics.

¹⁵ This phrase is taken from Keddie (1966).

¹⁶ Halil Fevzi, the Seyhul Islam of the time, attacked Afghani anonymously in his “*Suyuf al Qawati*, Berkes (1964: 266).

¹⁷ Afghani acquires Pan-Islamism as his ideology. Yet, paradoxically, despite his denunciation of Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s collaborationism, he is attracted by the British poet Blunt’s ideas that envisaged himself as the deliverer of Arabs and the reformer of Islam. Afghani although despising any British penetration and later denouncing the architects of Tanzimat for that matter seems to be at peace with going to a conference by the British who hoped to use him in their Indian and Egyptian aspirations. See Berkes (1964) for details on this point. Also, Keddie (1966) informs us that Afghani compares himself with Abu Muslim, an Iranian who rallied the pro-Abbasid forces against the Umayyads, and hence draws attention to the use of religious appeals with even messianic terminology for political purposes. He embraces pan-Islamism for the same reason and because he believes the Muslim world could and should be united under a strong Caliph. On political activism, also see Kedourie (1966).

¹⁸ Afghani probably would not agree with the observation that “Resit (the architect of Tanzimat) and his coadjutors were intelligent enough to see that if nothing were done to remove the grievances of the subject peoples, the empire might crumble into ruin even without foreign intervention” Lewis (1974: 44).

- ¹⁹ Relevantly, Keddie mentions that secular word for “war” is modified by religious connotations while the “holy war” expression is defined as national though she also indicates that the word “milliyeh” could still have a religious meaning and that in Afghanistan they are intertwined at any rate. Keddie also refers to Herzl, Gandhi and Jinnah with whom even the secular kind of nationalism appealed to religious admixtures.
- ²⁰ “And these traitors met their deserved punishment by the justice-enforcing hand” from Afghani’s book presented to Abdulhamid II. See Berkes (1964: 267) and Keddie (1966).
- ²¹ This could be a primary motivation of his attack on the men of *Tanzimat*, as suggested earlier. On the other hand, Kemal Atatürk, following WWI, would embark on such revolution in political and religious context as scientific education, freedom of conscience among others *after* his battle against Western imperialism, securing unification and independence first (for the Anatolian population). In that aspect (as well as others out of scope here) Kemal’s revolution differed from modernizing reforms in other Muslim countries where the reformers were put in charge by the British, the French and/or the Italians (excepting Egypt, though the parliamentary revolution there did not have an analogous attempt of full-scale change in political, legal, cultural and religious terms). So, on a related note, it would have been interesting to see Afghani’s reaction had he lived long enough to see the 20th century.

REFERENCES

- AFGHANI, Sayyid Jamal-ad-din, "Islamic Solidarity" in *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives*, (eds. Donohue, J. John and Esposito, L. John), Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 16-20.
- AFGHANI, Sayyid Jamal-ad-din, "Benefits of Philosophy" in *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani*, Keddie, Nikki, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968, pp. 109-123.
- AFGHANI, Sayyid Jamal-ad-din, "Answer to Renan" in *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani*, Keddie, Nikki, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968, pp.181-187.
- AFGHANI, Sayyid Jamal-ad-din, "The Refutation of Materialists" in *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani*, Keddie, Nikki, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968, pp.73-84.
- AFGHANI, Sayyid Jamal-ad-din, "The Truth about the Neicheri Sect" in *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani*, Keddie, Nikki, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968, pp. 130-132.
- AFGHANI, Sayyid Jamal-ad-din, "Lecture on Teaching and Learning" in *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani*, Keddie, Nikki, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968, pp. 101-108.
- AFGHANI, Sayyid Jamal-ad-din, "Commentary on the Commentator" in *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani*, Keddie, Nikki, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968, pp. 123-130.
- BERKES, Niyazi, (1964), *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, McGill University Press, Canada.
- DE SOTO, Hernando, (2000), *The Mystery of Capital*, Basic Books.
- DONOHUE, J. John & ESPOSITO, L. John, eds (2007), *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives*, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press.
- GEOFFREY, Lewis, (1974), *Modern Turkey*, 4th ed. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- HOURANI, Albert, (1983), *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939*, Cambridge University Press.
- KEDDIE, Nikki, (1970), "Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani: A Case of Posthumous Charisma?", in *Philosophers and Kings*, ed. by, Rustow, A.Dankwart, George Braziller, Inc., pp.148-180.

KEDDIE, Nikki, (1968), *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles.

KEDDIE, Nikki, (1966), "The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdulhamid II", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 3, No.1, pp. 46-67.

KEDOURİE, Elie, (1966), *Afghani and Abduh: An Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political Activism in Modern Islam*, Frank Cass.

LEWIS, Bernard, (1964), *The Middle East and the West*, London.

MARDIN, Şerif, (1962), *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.